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Abstract: Breaking down botnets have always been a big challenge. The robustness of C&C channels is increased, and the 
detection of botmaster is harder in P2P botnets. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic method to reconstruct the 
topologies of the C&C channel for P2P botnets. Due to the geographic dispersion of P2P botnet members, it is not possible 
to supervise all members, and there does not exist all necessary data for applying other graph reconstruction methods. So 
far, no general method has been introduced to reconstruct C&C channel topology for all type of P2P botnet. 
In our method, the probability of connections between bots is estimated by using the inaccurate receiving times of several 
cascades, network model parameters of C&C channel, and end-to-end delay distribution of the Internet. The receiving times 
can be collected by observing the external reaction of bots to commands. The results of our simulations show that more than 
90% of the edges in a 1000-member network with node degree mean 50, have been accurately estimated by collecting the 
inaccurate receiving times of 22 cascades. In case the receiving times of just half of the bots are collected, this accuracy of 
estimation is obtained by using 95 cascades.
1. Introduction 
With the spread of Internet access and their 
widespread use among people, the number of malicious users 
has also increased. Malicious users have always been seeking 
to reach their goals by creating and distributing malware in 
computer networks and infecting machines connected to 
these networks. In order to hide and gain more power, 
malicious users tend to use the resources of infected hosts. In 
recent years, dealing with organized malware has gained 
more importance. 
The botnet is an important category of organized 
malware. Botmasters remotely control and lead infected hosts 
by issuing commands to those bots which can find access 
through command and control (C&C) channels. Investigators 
seek to unveil hidden dimensions of a crime by analyzing 
evidence gathered from C&C channels; however, botnet 
developers tend to adopt diverse techniques in order to hide 
the evidence. 
Even though researchers try to detect a botnet and 
uncover its function details through botnet analysis, botnet 
developers make efforts to prevent easy analysis by using 
anti-forensics techniques such as encrypting and packing. 
Moreover, botnet developers hide the origin of the issued 
commands through changing the architecture of C&C 
channel from centralized to decentralized such as peer-to-
peer (P2P) network. 
In a P2P botnet, each command is forwarded by botnet 
members in several steps, delivering the command to all 
members. In this propagation, not all botnet members have 
direct connections with botmaster and this makes the 
investigator unable to discover the botmaster and break down 
the C&C channel. Being aware of the network topology for a 
P2P botnet (i.e., C&C channel) is a great asset for 
investigators to resolve questions related to P2P botnet 
forensics [1]. This knowledge facilitates the discovery of 
botmaster and the development of countermeasures against 
botnet attacks. 
Most of the previous studies on P2P botnets have 
focused on the issue of detection, and finding botnet topology 
has not been addressed. In studies proposing botnet 
countermeasures and methods for finding botmaster, the 
approaches are not based on the reconstruction of the C&C 
channel as well [2]. While finding this topology, can help to 
resolve related issues more effectively and precisely. 
In this paper, we propose a method for the 
reconstruction of P2P botnet C&C channel topology, which 
can accurately determine the connections among bots. The 
focus of this paper is on botnets, whose P2P network is based 
on a random model. 
In our method, the topology of the botnet is 
reconstructed by employing a probabilistic approach. 
Moreover, in this method, we use the parameters of botnets 
graph model, the inaccurate receiving time of data in some of 
the botnet members in certain cascades, and end-to-end delay 
distribution on the Internet. Since the necessary data for our 
method does not depend at all on the type of P2P botnet 
protocol and the content of the message, our method can be 
used for all botnets. 
The parameters of the botnet graph model include the 
number of nodes and their degrees mean. The P2P botnet 
members can be detected by methods such as enumeration or 
monitoring of the reactions to original or forged commands. 
The degrees mean can be measured by analyzing bot code or 
some node connections. 
Moreover, the receiving time of command in each bot 
can be obtained by collecting the beginning time of each bot 
attack in the victim or the connecting time of each botnet to a 
certain server for updating after receiving the update 
command. In some structured P2P Botnet, the approximate 
receiving time of command or control packet is obtained 
through distributed hash table (DHT) traffic monitoring [3]. 
The contribution of our method is to propose a 
reconstruction method for P2P botnet C&C channel based on 
the partial information that can be gathered in many types of 
botnets before analyzing the malware. Our method detects the 
edges of the network with high accuracy and its results can 
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also be used to defend against botnet. This method is general 
and is not related to a particular botnet. Moreover, we use the 
partial gatherable information in P2P botnet, but the 
information used in other methods is difficult to collect in 
practical environments or must be complete. 
In our proposed method, first, we obtain the end-to-
end delay distribution on the Internet and then by using this 
distribution we estimate the level of each node in all cascades. 
The probability of each edge is calculated by considering the 
fact that each edge can only be linked to two nodes with the 
consecutive level in a cascade. Finally, the reconstructed 
graph is obtained by combining the probability of each edge 
in all of the cascades. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we 
describe P2P botnet’s characteristics and present its data 
gathering methods and address some forensic issues. 
Network reconstruction methods and their uses are studied in 
section 3. In section 4, we present our method and describe 
the steps followed. The introduced method is evaluated and 
the results of the simulations are discussed in section 5, and 
finally, our conclusion is given in section 6. 
 
2. P2P Botnet 
In 2003, Slapper was known as the first worm that 
used P2P protocol. Furthermore, in the same year, Sinit P2P 
botnet was discovered which used random scanning to find 
other peers [4]. Other P2P botnets such as Phatbot, Nugach, 
Storm, and Peacomm were gradually detected in the 
following years. Some famous P2P botnets such as Mega-D, 
Conficker, and TDL-4 have been propagated in recent years 
and their members have been estimated from 500 thousand to 
10 million. It is worth mentioning that P2P botnets have a lot 
of members, due to limited countermeasure mechanisms 
against them. 
Compared to centralized botnets, decentralized 
botnets have higher flexibility and robustness in handling a 
large number of bots. Since they do not have any specific 
point of failure, they are very hard to break down [5]. It is 
almost impossible to disable their C&C channels even by 
detecting and mitigating some of the bots. 
Most decentralized botnets utilize different types of 
P2P protocols to construct an overlay network. This P2P 
overlay Network is classified as follows [2]: 
 
 Unconstructed P2P overlay which uses alternative 
methods such as flooding, as it does not have any 
key look-up and routing features. 
 Structured P2P overlay which uses routing method 
such as the distributed hash table. 
 Super-peer overlay which has some peers with valid 
IP addresses as temporary servers controlling the 
network. 
 
P2P networks are modeled by different types of 
statistical network models [6, 7] such as Erdos-Renyi random 
graphs, Barabasi-Albert Scale-free graph or Watts-Strogatz 
Small-world graph models. In the random graphs model, each 
edge occurs independently with equal probability. Networks 
following a scale-free graph model have a few numbers of 
nodes with high degree and a large number of nodes with low 
degree. In the small-world graph model, the distance of each 
node to most of the other nodes is smaller than a certain 
number of hops [8]. 
The following four models have been presented in [7] 
for botnet network models:  random, scale-free, small-world, 
and P2P. Moreover, it should be noted that the structured P2P 
botnet and the unstructured P2P botnet are believed to be 
respectively similar to the random and the scale-free network 
models [7]. Super-peer botnets are similar to centralized 
botnets and super-peer is a single point of failure for the 
botnet network. So, botnets do not tend toward this design [2, 
9]. 
Efficiency and performance of C&C channel of botnet 
depend on the inherent characteristics of basic graph models. 
These graph models are used to analyze the infection 
distribution in a network and its resistance against the failures 
of edges and nodes [10].   
Studies show that the random graph model, compared 
to other models, is more resistant against the intentional 
removal of a certain node. Moreover, it is clearly observed 
that the removal of high-degree nodes in free-scale graphs 
strongly affect the connectivity of the graphs [6, 11]. Hence, 
we are more motivated to work on the random graph model. 
The focus of this paper is on the reconstruction of C&C 
channels for random network type of P2P botnet. 
In structured P2P botnets, each node connects to at 
most a certain number of the peer, where this number is 
related to the routing mechanism in P2P protocol. Since 
structured P2P botnets have fixed maximum degree nodes, 
they are considered as random network model [7]. If 
unstructured P2P botnets have power-law degree distribution, 
then researchers use the scale-free model for their analysis. 
As in most of the unstructured botnets, the connections of 
each bot are usually limited to a certain number, and even the 
number of peers in a peer-list is fixed [12], so they are random 
networks. 
In random graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸)  with 𝑁 vertices, each 
node connects to other 𝑁 − 1 nodes with the same probability. 
If the probability of connection between two nodes is 𝑝, then 
the probability of a node with degree ?̅? can be presented by 
the following binomial distribution: 
 
Pr⁡(?̅?) = (
𝑁 − 1
𝑘
)𝑝?̅?(1 − 𝑝)𝑁−1−?̅? 
 
The occurrence of a big number of connections in a 
host is a rare phenomenon even in P2P applications. 
Therefore, botmaster considers a small ?̅? in order to prevent 
the detection of host infection. Moreover, due to the improved 
botnet performance and the need to prevent the disclosure of 
botmaster members’ data, the number of nodes in a peer list 
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is limited [13]. Botnets whose members use random scanning 
method to find peer nodes also are random network. 
By examining some infected hosts, the botnet 
characteristics can be discovered in order to recognize its 
network model. Using honeypot techniques is one of the ways 
to catch an infected node. Other methods such as network 
behavior monitoring and reverse engineering can also help 
with the recognition of a botnet model. Hence, finding the 
value of ?̅?  in botnets can be made possible through 
discovering the hardcoded limitation value or the number of 
concurrent connections with other bots.  
Table 1 Comparison of P2P botnet topology discovery methods 
Method Mode Required Knowledge Behind NAT Node Recall FPR 
Crawler [14, 17] active high undetectable medium low 
Sensor Node [14, 18] passive high detectable high medium 
Our method passive low detectable high medium 
 
There are various methods for the enumeration of 
botnet members [14, 15]. The enumeration of centralized 
botnets, in which members can be detected by spying on C&C 
servers, is easier than that of decentralized botnets. In P2P 
botnets which send the members list to each other or possess 
super peers that have access to the list of members, botnet 
members can be counted by obtaining this list. 
One of the enumeration methods is the examination of 
gathered evidence of the botnet attack. Victim’s firewall log 
can serve as good evidence for the enumeration of botnet 
members. Also in P2P botnets in which each bot constantly 
listens to a certain port for connecting other members, the 
number of botnet members can be obtained by counting the 
addresses on the Internet with these characteristics. There are 
also some methods that estimate the number of botnet's nodes, 
using a local measurement [15]. 
Enumeration or estimation methods can be used to 
find parameter 𝑁 of the random graph model in which, after 
obtaining degree ?̅? for each node, 𝑝 can be found through the 
following equation: 
𝑝 =
?̅?
𝑁 − 1
 
 
In our method, in addition to the parameters of the 
random network model, the receiving time of cascades 
propagated in a botnet and the end-to-end delay distribution 
on Internet need to be obtained. The first receiving time of 
cascades distributed by botnet members can be obtained 
through different methods such as connection log, botnet 
monitoring or attack evidence examining. Our method to 
obtain the delay distribution on the Internet is described in 
section 4. 
3. Related work  
For the discovering of P2P botnet topology, there has 
not been any method yet that can be used for all botnets and 
does not depend on the type of botnet. The methods that can 
discover the topology of P2P botnet on overlay level need to 
completely know the botnet and its protocol. Gaining 
complete knowledge of the protocol to send a message or add 
node requires for a thorough analysis of the botnet. This task 
gets even more difficult in case countermeasure mechanisms 
have been applied by the botnet. 
In order to reconstruct scenarios of centralized botnet 
attacks, it is reported in [16] how the IP-level topology of the 
infected nodes was formed in Testbed@TWISC network, 
where only a limited number of nodes was infected with 
botnets. This method reconstructs IP-level topology of two 
centralized botnets by capturing all the traffics. 
In the methods of crawling [14, 17] and adding sensor 
nodes [14, 18] for collecting data have been discussed. In 
these methods, if the connection information or peer-list of 
each node can be collected, then the graph can also be 
discovered. Crawling method collects the connections of the 
whole network by using graph search. The botnet network can 
also be discovered by adding sensor nodes to the botnet and 
gathering the connection information from each node. 
In order to apply the crawling and the sensor nodes 
methods, we must be completely aware of the botnet protocol. 
The botnet must also match with the required characteristics 
of the methods. Some methods [19] have been presented for 
improving P2P botnet to oppose these discovery methods that 
make it impossible to send a message to peer-list from an 
unknown source and to add the sensor node. 
Table 1 shows the properties of different methods for 
the discovery of the P2P botnet topology and our 
reconstruction method. The crawler is an active method and 
requires to send data in the network. So, some botnets can 
also bypass the crawler [20]. For applying crawler and sensor 
node methods, knowledge of the botnet architecture and its 
protocol is needed. Also, it is very time-consuming to know 
a botnet completely. By using the least possible information 
about the botnet functionality, our method can reconstruct the 
botnet by only monitoring the external behavior of botnet. As 
opposed to other methods, in the crawler method, it is not 
possible to discover the connections behind NAT and nodes 
do not have a valid IP.  
The crawler and the sensor node methods have been 
proposed to gather information from P2P botnets, not to 
discover the topologies. Hence, the accuracy of the 
discovered topology has not been discussed. Moreover, the 
topology of the real botnet is unknown and so Recall 
(detection rate) and FPR cannot be calculated. Since the 
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number of cascades affects our results, it is not feasible to 
compare the results of our method with the results of other 
methods. We only compare Recall and FPR of the methods 
in table 1 qualitatively. 
Due to the lack of knowledge about the connections 
behind NAT, Recall is smaller in the crawler method 
compared to other methods, but the discovered edges have 
lower FPR. In the node sensor method, if the node behind 
NAT is not connected to the sensor for collecting the data, it 
will not be possible to detect the connection. While in our 
method, by the increase of the cascades, higher Recall and 
lower FPR are obtained. 
There exist various fields of research, such as physics, 
engineering, biology, and medicine [14] with the purpose of 
finding the connections among the members of a certain set, 
and with approaches that are only different in terms of 
necessary data, limitations, and applications but can be 
considered similar in finding the edges of a graph [21]. 
Some methods reconstruct the graph by using 
neighborhood information. One of such studies is [22], in 
which the graph has been reconstructed by having the number 
of common neighbors of each node pair in a social network. 
But due to the lack of a mechanism for monitoring botnets' 
neighbors, the neighborhood information cannot be collected 
for P2P botnets, and the method is not applicable for P2P 
botnets. 
For reconstructing P2P botnets, it is difficult to bypass 
a method that can passively collect the required data from the 
network and reconstruct it with high accuracy. The only data 
that may be collected is the time of bot reactions to the 
received commands. The received time of commands by each 
node is the base of our method for the reconstruction of the 
botnet topology regardless of the type of the botnet. In other 
words, each command in the network is distributed as a 
cascade, and each node reacts to the command after receiving 
the cascade. In this section, we review the previous studies 
which have used nodes receiving times of cascades for 
general network reconstruction. 
One of the reconstruction methods [23], has sought to 
reconstruct the graph by using the receiving time of the 
cascade by each node. In this method, the graph model has 
not been considered, and the network reconstruction can be 
achieved only by using the gathered times. Finally, the most 
probable topology of the graph which is more compatible 
with the gathered times will be presented as a result.  
The computational complexity of this method [23] is 
in super exponential order and the problem of finding the 
most probable graph is an NP-hard problem. The 
simplifications, presented to reduce the computational 
complexity and perform the algorithm, have led to an error 
increase in results. Notwithstanding, this method cannot be 
used in networks with many nodes; moreover, it is specific to 
directed graphs, while the C&C channel of P2P botnets has 
an undirected graph topology. 
If it is possible to control some of the nodes, the 
introduced method in [24] can reconstruct the routing graph 
of the Internet, by using the partial information gathered from 
the “Traceroute” command to probe the paths between the 
nodes. Since there is no similar command in the overlay layer, 
this method is not applicable to overlay networks of P2P 
botnets. 
There are some methods that reconstruct the graph 
through sparse recovery techniques [25, 26]. According to 
such methods, the graph can be interpreted as a sparse signal 
measured through cascades. However, the assumptions of 
these methods, i.e., directed edge, node degree, and weight of 
edges, are incompatible with P2P botnets and impractical for 
the reconstruction. 
Another study with a probabilistic approach for the 
reconstruction of neural network uses the Bayesian method in 
the non-parametric algorithm [27]. The Cascades in neural 
networks are electric signals diffused in neural networks.  
This method reconstructs the directed network by using 
receiving time of cascades. 
Since examining all possible graph topologies is a 
very time-consuming job, in this method [27], it has been 
assumed that each node can only receive data from a certain 
number of preceding nodes. Also in each step, the probability 
of edges is updated based on the receiving time of next 
cascades; finally from all probable topologies, the one with 
the highest probability is selected. 
One of the disadvantages of methods which use 
Bayesian is that last cascades gain more importance and it is 
even likely that initial cascades get neglected. Moreover, the 
error in reconstruction rises with intense noise in last cascades. 
Another issue in the mentioned method is assigning the initial 
probabilities of edges which have been assumed equal in this 
study. 
The method in [28] with a non-probabilistic approach, 
presents an algorithm called Netcover, which reconstructs the 
network by using the order of the nodes in each cascade. This 
method has been presented for directed graphs and is based 
on the rule that each node receives the data solely from its 
preceding nodes in the cascade.   
In this algorithm [28], the input edges for each node 
are selected in such a way that with the least edges, all 
cascades conform to this rule. This method changes the issue 
from the reconstruction of the graph in each node to the 
coverage of sets and solves the problem with the greedy 
approach. The purpose of this greedy method is selecting the 
least possible number of edges and might not be reasonable 
in many of the applications. 
Another method [29], put forward for random graphs 
collaboratively works with some of the participant nodes to 
reconstruct network. This method uses the end to end delay 
of four nodes for finding the topology of their middle nodes. 
Random graph model examined in this study reduces the 
number of possible topologies in the four nodes and 
consequently decreases the error rate in this method. 
One of the disadvantages of this method [29] is that 
the minimal representative graph in this method is 
reconstructed from the main graph and might leave many 
nodes unrecognized. Besides, it is sometimes difficult to 
choose the right topology from among several possible 
topologies. The number of participant nodes required in this 
method is another disadvantage which is very hard to obtain 
in some practical applications.  
Some of the issues that make the above-mentioned 
methods inefficient in the reconstruction of the C&C channel 
and P2P botnets include high time complexity for the big 
number of nodes and less accurate results. In addition, in 
these methods network characteristics and their applications 
have not been sufficiently taken into account. 
Due to the disadvantages of other methods, and also 
the fact that reconstruction graph from temporal data of its 
nodes is still a challenge [30,31], in this study, we present a 
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method which uses network characteristics and times 
gathered from cascades propagation to reconstruct the C&C 
channels of P2P botnets. If it is possible to select the root node 
for the cascade propagation, future cascades can be 
propagated from a node with more influence on the correction 
of the then obtained results. 
4. Our method 
We have adopted a probabilistic approach in our 
method and used partial gatherable data from P2P botnet 
networks. This data can be gathered from both directions of 
connections between bots. In our method, like most network 
reconstruction methods, the graph nodes are known. Attacked 
target logs or revealed peer lists constitute a good source for 
finding graph nodes and their IP addresses. 
After collecting the necessary data by observing some 
cascades, our network reconstruction method is done in three 
steps. In the first step, the level of each observed node in each 
cascade is estimated, and in the second step, nodes level 
distribution in cascades is extracted. In the third step, the 
more probable edges are detected and presented as a 
reconstructed network. 
 
4.1. Level Discovery 
 
The level of a node refers to the smallest hop count 
between cascade root and the node. In the first step, the level 
of each node in a cascade is determined based on the 
receiving time of each node and the delay distribution 
between each node pair in the overlay network. In our method, 
node level is defined as the shortest hop count distance 
between node and cascade root. 
In our method, we assume to have a random graph 
model and the delay distribution of overlay connection 
between two peers. Random graph model parameter 𝑁  is 
equal to the number of botnet members whose enumeration 
method has been explained before. Also, parameter 𝑝 of this 
model is obtained from node degree distribution by observing 
the connection degree of some bots or reverse engineering of 
botnet protocol. 
In [32], it has been concluded that the delay between 
any internet node pair has a Gamma distribution, so the delay 
distribution between two botnet nodes is described as  
 
𝑃𝑟(𝜏) =
1
𝛤(𝑘)𝜃𝑘
𝜏𝑘−1𝑒−
𝜏
𝜃⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(1) 
 
 
where 𝑘  and 𝜃  are shape and scale parameters of Gamma 
distribution and 𝜏 is delay. Due to the delay restriction on data 
transmission between nodes, a time constraint is defined on 
the delay between nodes 𝑎𝑖 and 𝑎𝑗. That is the delay of each 
node is limited between 𝜏𝑚𝑖𝑛  and 𝜏𝑚𝑎𝑥  and the delay 
distribution is truncated as: 
 
𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦(𝜏) ≜ 𝑃𝑟(𝜏|𝜏𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏𝑚𝑎𝑥)
=
1
𝛤(𝑘)𝜃𝑘
𝜏𝑘−1𝑒−
𝜏
𝜃
𝐹(𝜏𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝐹(𝜏𝑚𝑖𝑛)
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(2) 
 
 
where 𝐹(𝜏) =
1
𝛤(𝑘)
𝛾(𝑘,
𝜏
𝜃
)  is a cumulative distribution 
function for delay 𝜏. If, after collecting the receiving time in 
each node for a cascade, the time difference of that node pair 
is less than 𝜏𝑚𝑖𝑛 or more than 𝜏𝑚𝑎𝑥, then the edge probability 
is zero. 
After obtaining the truncated delay distribution and 
collecting the receiving times of all cascades, the following 
sequence is generated for each cascade 𝑐 by sorting the nodes 
based on receiving time.  
 
< 𝑎1
𝑐 , 𝑡1
𝑐 >,< 𝑎2
𝑐 , 𝑡2
𝑐 >,… ,< 𝑎𝑁
𝑐 , 𝑡𝑁
𝑐 >:⁡⁡ ∀⁡𝑖 < 𝑁⁡⁡⁡𝑡𝑖
𝑐 ≤⁡ 𝑡𝑖+1
𝑐  
 
If the difference between the receiving time of a node 
and its immediate previous node is bigger than 𝜏𝑚𝑎𝑥, or the 
difference between receiving time of the node and all 
preceding nodes is smaller than 𝜏𝑚𝑖𝑛, or there is no preceding 
node, then the node is considered to be in level one. So, the 
probability of the first level for this node is equal to one, and 
the probability of level 𝐿 for other nodes is obtained using the 
following equation 3. 
 
𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙(𝑙𝑘
𝑐 = 𝐿)
=
∑ 𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙(𝑙𝑖
𝑐 = 𝐿 − 1) 𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦(𝑡𝑘
𝑐 − 𝑡𝑖
𝑐)𝑘−1𝑖=1
∑ (∑ 𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙(𝑙𝑖
𝑐 = 𝑗 − 1)𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦⁡(𝑡𝑘
𝑐 − 𝑡𝑖
𝑐))𝑘−1𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑗=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(3) 
 
 
where 𝑙𝑘
𝑐 ⁡denotes the level of node 𝑎𝑘  in cascade c and 𝑡𝑘
𝑐 is 
the receiving time of cascade 𝑐 for node 𝑎𝑘. After calculating 
the probability of any node of cascade 𝑐 being in level 𝐿, the 
hop distance between that node and the cascade root is equal 
to the highest probability level. 
 
4.2. Level Distribution 
 
In [33], it has been shown that the shortest path in 
random networks has a Weibull distribution. Hence, level 
Distribution for nodes follows the same Weibull distribution, 
as level distribution and shortest path are essentially similar 
problems. In our simulation of random graphs, we observed 
that nodes level distribution of all cascades in these networks 
is very close to the shortest path distribution and follows 
Weibull distribution, as the experiments described in section 
5 indicates the same conclusion.  
So, by using the parameters of the random network 
model of C&C channel, we can find the distribution of nodes 
level in all cascade in this network, and consequently, 
estimate the number of nodes in each level. Moreover, in each 
level, we can find the number of hidden nodes whose 
receiving time of cascade could not be gathered. 
In the random networks, the smaller the probability 𝑝, 
i.e. the fewer nodes connection, the bigger the domain of 
distribution and the graph diameter. The obtained distribution 
can be used to estimate the number of invisible nodes of each 
level and even levels in which no nodes have been observed. 
In order to estimate the number of nodes in each level, 
we must obtain Weibull distribution of nodes level in the 
graph. Hence, first we generate some instances of the graph 
on the basis of the random network model parameters 𝑁, and 
𝑝, then we find the levels of nodes in all possible cascades. 
Finally, after obtaining the histogram of levels, we fit Weibull 
distribution to this histogram. 
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The occurrence of a case, where there is a gap between 
estimated levels, i.e., where a node level is estimated to be 1, 
despite the existence of previous nodes in the sequence, 
shows the existence of some levels of which no member 
nodes have been observed. In this case, the hop distance 
between the nodes that immediately precede the gap and the 
first nodes is definitely more than one and there is no edge 
between these two sets of nodes. 
Although solving the challenge of the existing gap size 
does not affect our network reconstruction method, it is 
necessary to estimate the number of invisible nodes in the gap 
for determining the existence of any unknown nodes at the 
beginning or the end of the sequence. To achieve this, first, 
we calculate the centroid 𝑇𝑙
𝑐⁡of each level. A centroid can be 
calculated through the following equation: 
 
𝑇𝑙
𝑐 =
∑ 𝑡𝑖
𝑐𝑃(𝑙𝑘
𝑐 = 𝑙)𝑁𝑖=1
∑ 𝑃(𝑙𝑘
𝑐 = 𝑙)𝑁𝑖=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(4) 
 
 
 
  
 
∆𝑇𝐴𝑉𝐺
𝑐 =
∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑐 − 𝑇𝑖−1
𝑐 ⁡⁡⁡(𝑖𝑓⁡𝑖𝑛⁡𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙⁡𝑖, 𝑖 − 1⁡ℎ𝑎𝑠⁡𝑎𝑡⁡𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡⁡𝑜𝑛𝑒⁡𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟)𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖=2
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒⁡𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑠
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5) 
 
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑐 = ∑𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙(𝑙𝑖
𝑐 = 𝐿)𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙(𝑙𝑗
𝑐 = 𝐿 + 1)𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦(𝑡𝑗
𝑐 − 𝑡𝑖
𝑐)
𝑁−1
𝐿=1
+∑𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙(𝑙𝑖
𝑐 = 𝐿)𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙(𝑙𝑗
𝑐 = 𝐿 − 1)𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦⁡(𝑡𝑖
𝑐 − 𝑡𝑗
𝑐)
𝑁
𝐿=2
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(6) 
 
Then, we estimate the time difference average for 
consecutive centroids by equation 5. After that, we estimate 
the number of invisible levels between the two node sets. This 
is equal to the number of ∆𝑇𝐴𝑉𝐺
𝑐  located between the centroid 
time of the preceding and the following levels of the gap. 
After finding the number of middle gaps levels, the 
estimated levels are modified. In order to do this, starting 
from the beginning of the sequence, the correction value is 
obtained by adding the number of estimated levels of each 
gap and the last preceding level. The correction value is then 
added to all the following levels in the sequence.  
If the biggest estimated level is equal to the diameter 
of the graph obtained from Weibull distribution, the 
probability of gap in the beginning or the end of the sequence 
is very low. Otherwise, we find the closest distribution to 
Weibull by increasing the estimated level of all nodes several 
times if necessary. In this way, the number of beginning and 
ending invisible levels are obtained. One of the advantages of 
detecting invisible levels is finding the distance between the 
origin of command and the visible nodes or the origin itself 
in P2P botnets. 
 
4.3. Network Reconstruction 
 
The method we use for network reconstruction is 
based on the fact that there is no edge between two nodes 
whose level difference is 2 or more in at least one cascade. If 
there is an edge between two nodes, then their estimated level 
difference must be less than or equal to 1, otherwise, there is 
definitely no edge between them. In other words, if by 
considering the delay distribution, the delay probability for 
the time difference of each node pair is zero, then there are no 
edges between them. 
Thus, in our method after estimating the level of each 
node in cascade c, we add edge 𝑒𝑖𝑗  with weight 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑐  to 
temporary edges, to indicate our confidence on the existence 
of the edge between nodes 𝑎𝑖  and ⁡𝑎𝑗 . The weight 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑐  is 
calculated by equation 6 for two nodes of a link with 
estimated successive levels. 
We calculate the weight of each edge in different 
cascades and if in at least one cascade this weight becomes 
zero, our assumption about the existence of this edge is 
contradicted. In this case, we will remove this edge from 
temporary edges. 
After observing the receiving time of each cascade and 
calculating its edge weight, the total of the edge weight 𝑾𝑒𝑖𝑗 
for all the observed cascades is calculated by equation 7. The 
reconstructed edges are selected from the temporary edges 
with the biggest total weight. 
 
 𝑾𝑒𝑖𝑗 =∑𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑐 ⁡
𝐶
𝑐=1
+∑𝑤𝑒𝑗𝑖
𝑐 ⁡
𝐶
𝑐=1
⁡⁡⁡(7)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡  
Algorithm 1 provides the pseudocode of our method 
to reconstruct the graph by having the receiving times of 𝑀 
cascades. The time complexity of this algorithm 
is⁡𝑂(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 × 𝑀𝑁2), where 𝑁 is the number of nodes, 
and 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  is the maximum level of each node in all 
cascades, that is calculated for certain random graph. In this 
algorithm, first, the level probability of all peers for each 
cascade is obtained, and then the edge probability is 
calculated. Finally, the edge probabilities are combined for all 
cascades, and the reconstructed graph is returned. 
It should be noted that the number of the selected 
reconstructed edges is equal to the mean of the random graph 
edges, i.e., 𝑝(𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/2).  Moreover, the reconstructed 
edges are selected from the temporary edges having a delay 
probability of more than zero in all cascades. 
 
Algorithm 1 our reconstruction method 
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Input: an N-member list of peers, receiving times for M 
cascades, link probability p 
Output: a reconstructed graph 
 
for each edge 𝑒𝑖𝑗 ,⁡where⁡0 < 𝑖, 𝑗 ≤ 𝑁: 
     𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑗 ← 0 
temporary-edges← (all of the possible edges) 
for each cascade ⁡𝑐𝑚,⁡where 0 < 𝑚 ≤ 𝑀: 
    sorted-node-list ← sort-by-time(nodes of 𝑐𝑚) 
    for each node 𝑘 in sorted-node-list: 
        for each level 𝐿,⁡where 0 < 𝐿 ≤ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙: 
            Calculate 𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙(𝑙𝑘
𝑐𝑚 = 𝐿) by equation (3) 
    for each edge 𝑒𝑖𝑗 ,⁡⁡where 0 < 𝑖, 𝑗 ≤ 𝑁⁡: 
        for each level 𝐿,⁡where 0 < 𝐿 ≤ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙: 
            Calculate 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑐𝑚 by equation (6) 
            if (𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑐𝑚 = 0) then 
                remove 𝑒𝑖𝑗 from temporary-edges  
    𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑗 ← 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑐𝑚 +⁡𝑤𝑒𝑗𝑖
𝑐𝑚 +⁡𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑗 
edge-list ← sort-by-W(temporary-edges) 
reconsGraph ← select (
𝑁(𝑁−1)
2
⁡× 𝑝) edges from edge-list 
return reconsGraph 
5. Evaluation 
In order to evaluate our method in this paper, we use 
Recall and false positive rate (FPR) metrics. Recall is the 
fraction of the correctly reconstructed edges of the actual 
graph. FPR is the fraction of edges that do not exist in the 
actual graph but are incorrectly reconstructed. Using these 
metrics, we assess the accuracy of our method with respect to 
the similarity of the reconstructed graph to the actual one. 
In our method, the number of reconstructed edges for 
any random graph with a definite number of nodes is chosen 
to be equal to the average number of the edges of that graph. 
Then, the number of incorrectly reconstructed edges is 
approximately equal to the number of edges in the real graph 
that is missed in our results. So, the value of Precision metric 
is very close to Recall. In this paper, we do not deal with 
Precision metric separately. 
Since it is difficult to know the topology of real P2P 
botnets to compare the reconstructed graph to the actual one, 
and also there exists no data set for this purpose, we use 
simulation to evaluate our method. Another reason for using 
simulation is that it is impractical to generate the C&C 
channel topology by providing a set with a large number of 
supervised systems infected by the bot and dispersing them 
in different locations. 
The C&C channel of a P2P botnet is represented by a 
graph. In simulating Erdos-Renyi random graph for 
structured P2P botnets, the number of nodes and the 
probability of each edge between node pair should be known. 
First, all 𝑁  nodes are labelled, then an edge is assumed 
between every possible node pair with p probability. After 
that, a delay value is assigned for the assumed edges based on 
the end to end delay distribution on internet path. According 
to these delays, the data is propagated throughout the 
simulated C&C channel and received by all nodes. 
For simulating cascades, one node out of 𝑁 nodes is 
selected as the source node from which the data is propagated 
throughout the graph. The data is received by each node after 
being forwarded by adjacent nodes and later than the edge 
delay. In this simulation, we assume no delay in the nodes and 
each node immediately forwards a data to all adjacent nodes 
after receiving it for the first time but does not show any 
reaction when receiving it in the next times 
The first receiving times of data by nodes are inputs of 
our reconstruction method. In our evaluation, the receiving 
time of data by each node is indicated by observing the 
reaction of the node to the data. For this reason, the collected 
times include the delay between the node and the observer. 
Since this time is due to the end to end delay in the internet, 
we assigned its value by using the delay distribution of graph 
edges in simulation. In other words, the difference between 
the observed time and the real receiving time is as much as 
one graph edge delay. 
Since in each simulation, both the formation of the 
graph and the order of the cascades are random, we run each 
simulation 10 times to obtain Recall and FPR by calculating 
the average of their values in all runs. 
 
5.1. Delay Distribution 
 
In order to find the delay distribution of an edge of a 
real botnet on the Internet, we can use the precomputed delay 
distributions. These distributions are calculated by 
considering the location of the nodes related to the edge. In 
our simulation, the delay distribution of all edges is assigned 
based on a single delay distribution, because there are no 
precomputed delay distributions for any location of the nodes. 
In order to estimate the delay distribution, we used the 
data collected in NCC RIPE TTM project and fitted the 
histogram of internet delay between Middle East Technical 
University (METU) and Gebze Institute of Technology (GIT) 
to Gamma distribution in order to obtain its parameters. We 
obtained Gamma distribution with shape parameter k=42.27 
and scale parameter θ=0.35. Also, the minimum and 
maximum delay between METU and GIT are 5 and 517 
milliseconds. 
 
5.2. Level Discovery 
 
After collecting the receiving times in a cascade, we 
estimate node level using equation 3. In order to evaluate the 
first step of the method, we obtain Recall for node level. 
Recall for node level is the ratio of the number of correctly 
estimated node level to the total number of nodes in each 
cascade. 
 
a 
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b 
 
c 
Fig. 1.  Recall for Node Level vs. Delay Distribution 
Parameter Changes 
(a) Max Delay change, (b) shape change, (c) scale change 
 
Since the end-to-end delay distribution fitted in the 
previous section may have error and its parameters are not 
accurate, the changes of Recall for node level by each 
parameter of the delay distribution are examined. As shown 
in figure 1, Recall is hardly affected even with error in the 
estimation of the delay distribution parameters. In our study, 
this rate has been more than 89% in all the studied cases.  
Recall for node level obtained for all cascades of the 
graphs with 1000 nodes and the edge probabilities 0.01, 0.02, 
0.03, …, 0.10 are illustrated in Figure 2. The accurately 
detected node levels will be more than %92. With the increase 
of link probability, Recall for node level also gets bigger. This 
observation suggests that the bigger the link probability, the 
smaller the graph diameter and the less the error rate in level 
estimation. However, graphs with bigger diameters have 
more levels, so the accuracy of their estimated level is smaller. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Recall for Node Level vs. Various Link Probabilities 
 
The node level estimated with respect to the edge 
delay and the receiving time, might be different from the node 
level calculated with respect to the hop count. As a cascade 
propagation in a graph is reconstructed in a tree format, such 
a difference will not affect the results of reconstruction. In our 
method, the sequence of node level is used for reconstructing 
the edge and their exact levels are not important. 
 
5.3. Level Distribution 
 
In this simulation, in order to obtain the distribution 
for levels of nodes in cascades, first, each node is once 
considered as the root from which a cascade is propagated. 
Then the level distribution is obtained for that cascade. 
Finally, in order to aggregate the results, the sum number of 
nodes in each cascade is calculated and the level distribution 
for all cascades of the graph is obtained.  
 
Fig. 3.  Weibull Distribution fit to Level Distribution 
 
Our examinations on N nodes with different 
configuration, show that these two distributions are similar, 
and the number of nodes in each level can be estimated by 
fitting it to Weibull distribution. As shown in Figure 3, 
Weibull distribution with shape parameter k=4.923 and scale 
parameter θ=2.281 is obtained for a graph with 1000 nodes 
and link probability 0.05. 
The number of nodes in each level can be estimated 
by obtaining the Weibull distribution of node level in a 
random graph. If all receiving times in a cascade cannot be 
collected, the number of invisible nodes in each level can be 
estimated by using Weibull distribution. However, 
recognizing the invisible nodes in each level is not dealt with 
in this paper. Our method reconstructs the graph by using 
merely the level of the visible nodes. 
 
5.4. Network Reconstruction 
 
In order to evaluate the accuracy of our reconstruction 
method, after propagating each cascade of a graph, the weight 
of all possible edges are calculated by using equation 6. Then, 
the edges with more weight are presented as the reconstructed 
graph. Recall curve for the edge, in a graph with 1000 nodes 
and a link probability of 0.05 has been shown in Figure 4. As 
it can be seen in this figure, Recall for edge rises with the 
increase in the number of cascades, and Recall of 90 is 
obtained with 22 cascades. 
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Fig. 4.  Recall vs. various number of cascade 
 
Fig. 5.  Recall (Min, Mean, Max) 
 
In Figure 5, in addition to mean value, the minimum, 
and maximum difference have been illustrated to show the 
variance of the obtained Recall for each cascade. For example, 
with 14 cascades in a network with 1000 nodes and node 
degree mean 50, min, max, and average mean values are 
respectively 0.4407, 0.4739, and 0.4599. From Figure 5, no 
noticeable difference is observed among max, min and 
average Recall in different examinations. 
5.5. Required Cascades 
 
One of the main questions regarding our method is 
how to calculate the number of required cascades in network 
reconstruction to obtain a suitable Recall value in real P2P 
botnets. The number of all distinct cascades that can be 
propagated in a network is equal to the number of nodes in 
that network. In other words, the root of each cascade can be 
any node in the network resulting in a different cascade.  
As the number of members for any real P2P botnet is 
different, in order to assess the efficiency of our method for 
different types of botnets, the graphs have been selected with 
the different number of nodes in our experiments. Also, using 
different P2P protocols for implementation of C&C channel, 
results in the variation of node degrees and in other words, in 
our simulations the edge probability in random graph model 
is different. 
 
Fig. 6.  Recall for edge vs. number of graph nodes 
 
Thus, in order to obtain the number of required 
cascades for the reconstruction of the whole network, four 
graphs are examined. In these examinations of the random 
networks - with the same node degree mean distribution and 
the different number of nodes - Recalls are obtained per 
cascade added, until all cascades are covered in our method. 
Figure 6 shows Recalls of network reconstruction per 
cascades proportion increased. These networks have 500, 
1000, 1500, and 2000 nodes and the node degree mean 50. 
In these examinations, it was observed when the 
number of network nodes increases, we may obtain a certain 
Recall with a smaller proportion of all cascades. For example, 
to obtain a Recall of 90% for networks with 500, 1000, 1500, 
and 2000 nodes, respectively 0.034, 0.022, 0.017, and 0.014 
of all cascades are needed. 
If the mean of a node degree distribution is known, the 
probability of the edge in a random graph model is equal to 
the ratio of this mean to the total number of nodes. As in 
different P2P protocols, the number of adjacent nodes of each 
bot is limited, we do our experiments with different node 
degrees using the edge probability of random graph model 
obtained from those node degrees. 
In order to examine the effect of node degree on our 
method, Recalls for three graphs with 1000 nodes and the 
degree mean of 10, 20, 30, … 100 are obtained as shown in 
Figure 7. With our method, Recall gets smaller with the 
decrease in node degree and the increase in graph sparseness. 
Despite this, with 100 cascades out of 1000, Recall is still 
bigger than 0.92.  
According to the obtained results, our method is 
evaluated in even the worst case where the mean of graph 
degree is so small that the graph does not have a cycle. 
Although Recall of node level for a 1000-member graph is 
0.27, by using 315 cascades, the edge Recall reached 0.90. 
 Given the same node degree, it can be deduced that 
the decrease in the proportion of cascades needed to obtain a 
certain Recall, is due to the sparseness of graphs. The sparser 
the graph, the smaller the number of required cascades for the 
reconstruction of an adequate proportion of edges of the 
network. As a result, for real P2P botnets that have a great 
number of nodes, with even smaller cascade proportion, more 
accurate results are reached.  
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a 
 
b 
Fig. 7.  Recall and FPR vs. Node Degree changes 
(a) Recall, (b) FPR 
 
5.6. Partial Observations 
 
The results of our method have been examined in this 
section, assuming that it is impossible to obtain the receiving 
time of cascades by all the nodes. In order to do the 
examinations, we hide some of the data and exclude them 
from our observations in the simulation. This portion of data 
actually belongs to the part of nodes for which no data has 
been collected. These nodes are selected randomly from each 
cascade.  
The results of our method have been shown in Figure 
8 for %10, %15, %20, …, %50 of the invisible nodes. The 
more the share of the invisible nodes, the more cascades we 
need for obtaining the threshold. But the pattern of Recall 
increase is somehow similar in all observations. We can even 
reach Recall 0.90 with only half of the data from a 1000-node 
graph with node degree mean 50. 
 
 
Fig. 8.  Recall vs. Hidden Nodes Percent 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed a method for the 
reconstruction of P2P botnet C&C channel to help to resolve 
the problems and ambiguities in the investigation of P2P 
botnets. Considering the limitation of P2P botnet, our method 
reconstructs the C&C topology by collecting the receiving 
times of a cascade by each node and by using a random model 
network of C&C channel.  
In this method, at first, we obtain the probability of 
each node in each level of a cascade. Then based on that, the 
probability of edge in that cascade is obtained. Then by 
repeating this method for other cascades, we try to make the 
edge probability closer to the actual value. Finally, we 
propose the edges with the highest probability as the network 
edges.  
Our observation shows that this method can estimate 
the C&C channel with a good Recall by considering our 
evaluation results. The more our knowledge of the delay 
distribution and random graph model, the more accurate the 
obtained results. Moreover, with an increase of cascade 
numbers, the detection rate of our method increases, and the 
false positive rate decreases. If it is possible to distribute the 
forged cascades, then it is likely to obtain a considerable 
number of cascades quickly. 
In our method, Recall is higher for graphs with bigger 
node degree mean. The reason is that random graphs with 
lower node degree have a bigger diameter and a smaller 
Recall of node level. This condition results in the estimation 
of more wrong edges. Also, with the increase of cascades 
number, the distance between nodes may get bigger than one 
level, so the wrong results are corrected.  
The advantage of our method is that the C&C channel 
of P2P botnet can be reconstructed with acceptable 
complexity and high accuracy. This method is general and 
can be applied to a large number of P2P botnets. The novelty 
of our method is using end-to-end delay on the Internet for 
the first time and the probabilistic approach to reconstruct the 
topology based on P2P botnet characteristics. However, it 
cannot be applied to scale-free P2P botnets and the diversity 
of roots in observed cascades affects the results. 
Our proposed method can raise several open problems. 
By using the obtained topology, we can propose more 
efficient containment methods, and detect botmaster or its 
directly connected nodes. By using the reconstructed 
topology, the infection distribution path can be found, and the 
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infection type can be detected. In addition, this method can 
be used to reconstruct other random networks such as neural 
network or file sharing networks. 
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